The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack

In this paper, we introduce a novel jailbreak attack called Crescendo. Unlike existing jailbreak methods, Crescendo is a multi-turn jailbreak that interacts with the model in a seemingly benign manner. It begins with a general prompt or question about the task at hand and then gradually escalates the dialogue by referencing the model’s replies, progressively leading to a successful jailbreak. We evaluate Crescendo on various public systems, including ChatGPT, Gemini Pro, Gemini-Ultra, LlaMA-2 70b Chat, and Anthropic Chat. Our results demonstrate the strong efficacy of Crescendo, with it achieving high attack success rates across all evaluated models and tasks. Furthermore, we introduce Crescendomation, a tool that automates the Crescendo attack, and our evaluation showcases its effectiveness against state-of-the-art models.

Source: [2404.01833] Great, Now Write an Article About That: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack

World Check Database (quite probably filled with miscreants) was given to a 3rd party, taken from there and is now for sale online

The World-Check database used by businesses to verify the trustworthiness of users has fallen into the hands of cybercriminals.

The Register was contacted by a member of the GhostR group on Thursday, claiming responsibility for the theft. The authenticity of the claims was later verified by a spokesperson for the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), which maintains the database.

A spokesperson said the breach was genuine, but occurred at an unnamed third party, and work is underway to further protect data.

“This was not a security breach of LSEG/our systems,” said an LSEG spokesperson. “The incident involves a third party’s data set, which includes a copy of the World-Check data file.

“This was illegally obtained from the third party’s system. We are liaising with the affected third party, to ensure our data is protected and ensuring that any appropriate authorities are notified.”

The World-Check database aggregates information on undesirables such as terrorists, money launderers, dodgy politicians, and the like. It’s used by companies during Know Your Customer (KYC) checks, especially by banks and other financial institutions to verify their clients are who they claim to be.

No bank wants to be associated with a known money launderer, after all.

World-Check is a subscription-only service that pulls together data from open sources such as official sanctions lists, regulatory enforcement lists, government sources, and trusted media publications.

We asked GhostR about its motivations over email, but it didn’t respond to questioning. In the original message, the group said it would begin leaking the database soon. The first leak, so it claimed, will include details on thousands of individuals, including “royal family members.”

The miscreants provided us with a 10,000-record sample of the stolen data for our perusal, and to verify their claims were genuine. The database allegedly contains more than five million records in total.

A quick scan of the sample revealed a slew of names from various countries, all on the list for different reasons. Political figures, judges, diplomats, suspected terrorists, money launderers, drug lords, websites, businesses – the list goes on.

Known cybercriminals also appear on the list, including those suspected of working for China’s APT31, such as Zhao Guangzong and Ni Gaobin, who were added to sanctions lists just weeks ago. A Cypriot spyware firm is also nestled in the small sample we received.

World-Check data includes full names, the category of person (such as being a member of organized crime or a political figure), in some cases their specific job role, dates and places of birth (where known), other known aliases, social security numbers, their gender, and a small explanation of why they appear on the list.

Long term readers will remember that a previous edition of the database was leaked in 2016 back when World-Check was owned by Thomson Reuters. Back then, only 2.2 million records were included, so the current version implicates many more individuals, entities, and vessels.

A month later, the database was reportedly being flogged online, with copies fetching $6,750 a pop.

Despite aggregating data from what are supposed to be reliable sources, being added to the World-Check list has been known in the past to affect innocent people. At the time of the first leak nearly eight years ago, investigations revealed inaccuracies in its data and a range of false terrorism designations.

Various Britons were found to have had their HSBC bank accounts closed in 2014 after they were allegedly added to the World-Check list in error.

[…]

Source: Miscreants get their mits on the world’s KYC database • The Register

Breaking out of kiosk environments using keyboard media buttons via a BadUSB type attack

In early 2023 an awesome colleague (Andreas) spoke about an incident response case featuring thugs plugging a media keyboard into an ATM, and breaking out of its ATM kiosk software to install malware causing it to dispense $$$. This prompted me to spend some time during spring and summer of 2023 looking into Consumer Control, a subset of USB functionality, which is what allows media keyboards to launch and control various applications over USB with the press of single buttons; so called Consumer Control Buttons (CCBs). This writeup describes my research on the matter, and what I have nicknamed the USB HID & Run attack (credit to Roman for helping out with the name).

[…]

An attacker with access to the USB port of the kiosk, could potentially leverage this access to break out of the kiosk using keyboard shortcuts or CCBs.

[…]

Attacks on kiosks often focus on breaking out of the kiosk model to perform other actions on the underlying systems. Typical means of achieving this, either in the case of a kiosk equipped with a keyboard or with an on-screen keyboard, is to leverage either operating system-specific or application-specific keyboard shortcuts to trigger an event exposing unintended functionality. Examples of this include:

  • Leveraging built-in Windows shortcuts (e.g. Win+E to launch the File Explorer).
  • Leveraging application-specific shortcuts (e.g. ctrl+p which in many applications opens a print dialog from which the underlying file system can be reached).
  • Going completely bananas and doing “weird shit” with the hope of triggering an error that can be leveraged to access further functionality.

Often times, access to the underlying file system is enough to execute arbitrary code on the system. While details of this is beyond the scope of this project, Windows-based readers are encouraged to pause momentarily and do the following:

  • Press Win+E
  • Press ctrl+l
  • Type cmd
  • Press enter

Now imagine this was a kiosk instead, and you hopefully get the concept. Congratulations, you are now a computer hacker with the ability to execute arbitrary code on the system.

For kiosks that are not equipped with either a physical or on-screen keyboard, this becomes much more difficult. However, with physical access to a USB port, you can plug in your own keyboard and do the same thing.

A plethora of resources exist on the matter of breaking out of kiosks, documenting many of the methods I have used myself on real assessments. [1] is a generic but comprehensive resource, and [2] is a more in-depth article written by a kiosk lockdown software manufacturer that even goes into great detail on physical USB attacks. However, the topic of CCBs is not covered.

[…]

Media Keyboards and USB

What sets media keyboards apart from traditional keyboards is the presence of keys that automagically launch a new application, or control elements of a currently running application.

[…]

Manufacturers can choose to include these keys to for example launch a local file explorer, a web browser or a calculator application; all through USB.

[…]

The functionality that USB HID vendors can include in their devices is defined in the USB HID Usage Tables for USB document [7].

[…]

The Consumer Page of the USB HID usage tables [7, Ch. 15] defines multiple usage names. The following two look especially interesting:

  • Application Launch Buttons, used to launch applications (configured by the operating system vendor, e.g. Microsoft)
  • Generic GUI Application Controls, used to replicate control actions found in typical GUI applications such as pressing buttons and scrolling

[…]

In order to address the first objective set out by this project, I had to be able to send USB CCBs. As it would turn out, implementation of a "media keyboard" capable of sending arbitrary CCBs was trivial using a Teensyduino [10].

[…]

The following is a simple proof of concept, showcasing some interesting CCBs enabled by default in Windows 10 and 11.

/* 
Simple CCB cycling example wherein the Teensyduino becomes a USB media keyboard and cycles through CCBs that have an action in Windows 10/11.
Values for keypresses are taken from the USB HID Class specification.
Before compiling, select "Keyboard" from the "Tools > USB Type" menu.
*/

void setup() {
}

void loop() {
    Keyboard.press(( 0x183 | 0xE400 )); // Default media player
    Keyboard.release(( 0x183 | 0xE400 ));
    delay(500);
    
    Keyboard.press(( 0x18A | 0xE400 )); // Default email client
    Keyboard.release(( 0x18A | 0xE400 ));
    delay(500);

    Keyboard.press(( 0x192 | 0xE400 )); // Pop calc!
    Keyboard.release(( 0x192 | 0xE400 ));
    delay(500);

    Keyboard.press(( 0x194 | 0xE400 )); // File Explorer (This PC)
    Keyboard.release(( 0x194 | 0xE400 ));
    delay(500);

    Keyboard.press(( 0x223 | 0xE400 )); // Microsoft Edge
    Keyboard.release(( 0x223 | 0xE400 ));
    delay(500);
}

Compiling and uploading the above code to the Teensyduino board and subsequently plugging it into the USB port of a computer running a fresh Windows 10 launched the applications indicated by the comments in the code. That’s right, we just popped calc using CCBs. Note that these specific keys are the same as those defined in [9].

A small side note here is that I tried this using both a Teensyduino 2.0 and 3.2, they both work. However, I could only the latter of them to spoof Vendor ID and Product ID.

Distinguishing CCBs From Windows Keyboard Shortcuts

Equipped with the ability to send arbitrary CCBs using a Teensyduino, I set out to find out if CCBs are inherently different from builtin keyboard shortcuts in Windows, aiming to fulfill the second objective. To verify this, I disabled Windows keyboard shortcuts with the following command:

reg add "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v NoWinKeys /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

After rebooting the machine for the registry change to take effect, I plugged in the Teensyduino. Lo and behold, Keyboard.press(( 0x194 | 0xE400 )); caused This PC to pop up, whereas Win+E did nothing (except put a smile on my face).

[…]

The following is a list of systems/devices I have experimented on with CCBs, with limited success:

  • Windows 10/11 single-app kiosk [11]: CCBs seem to have no effect in a kiosk with Microsoft Edge
  • Windows 10/11 digital signage mode [12]: The key AC Home (0x223) opens up an InPrivate window
  • Various Samsung TVs: Possible to open and navigate the menu using CCBs

Additionally, I recently had the opportunity to experiment with an Android-based meeting room controller. With a regular keyboard, I was unable to perform any unintended action. However, when using CCBs (specifically the keys AL Contacts/Address Book (0x18D), AL Calendar/Schedule (0x18E), and AL Internet Browser (0x196)), I observed that they triggered the launch of the Android Contacts application, the Android Calendar application, and the default Internet browser of the tablet.

[…]

Source: USB Hid And Run | Github

Also: USB Consumer Control – POC for Flipper | Github

DDOS attack takes down NL provinces and government organizations’ websites

Various websites of provinces and government organizations were down on Monday due to a DDOS attack. At the moment, the website of the Province of North Holland is still unavailable or unavailable again.

The websites of the provinces of Groningen, Overijssel and North Brabant were also down for some time.

The sites of the Senate and the ports of Amsterdam and Den Helder were also bombarded.

According to FalconFeeds, a cyber threat intelligence platform, the DDoS attack was claimed by pro-Russian hacker group NoName05716. The attack is said to be in retaliation for the Dutch decision to give F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine.

More than a year ago, the province of North Holland was also the victim of a DDoS attack for some time.

Thanks to a temporary solution, the Groningen site is working again and subsidies and permits can also be applied for.

Research is still underway into the cause and possible consequences of this DDoS attack.

Source: DDOS aanval legt websites provincies en overheidsorganisaties plat – Emerce

Burglars using Wifi jammers and deauth attacks to disable wireless smart home security

Edina police believe that the suspects aren’t choosing houses at random –they’re researching carefully prior to burglarizing them. The suspects are stealing jewelry, safes, and high-end merchandise.

“It’s believed the burglars are not violent and tend to choose unoccupied houses,” the police’s report reads.

At the city safety meeting on January 31st, residents warned about the burglars using WiFi jammers to impact security systems, especially surveillance cameras.

Many home security devices connect directly to the WiFi network or a smart home hub using radio frequencies such as 2.4 GHz. Their signal strength is limited and is susceptible to interference.

Jammers can overpower signals from security devices by sending a “loud” noise in the same range of frequencies. For receivers, it’s then impossible to distinguish between the genuine signals and the disruptive noise generated by the jammers.

The use of jammers in the United States is banned by the Federal Communications Commission

Source: Burglars using jammers to disable wireless smart home security | Cybernews

De-authing involves sending packets which disconnect devices from the network and is much easier than jamming.

Researchers jailbreak AI chatbots with ASCII art

Researchers based in Washington and Chicago have developed ArtPrompt, a new way to circumvent the safety measures built into large language models (LLMs). According to the research paper ArtPrompt: ASCII Art-based Jailbreak Attacks against Aligned LLMs, chatbots such as GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Gemini, Claude, and Llama2 can be induced to respond to queries they are designed to reject using ASCII art prompts generated by their ArtPrompt tool. It is a simple and effective attack, and the paper provides examples of the ArtPrompt-induced chatbots advising on how to build bombs and make counterfeit money.

[…]

To best understand ArtPrompt and how it works, it is probably simplest to check out the two examples provided by the research team behind the tool. In Figure 1 above, you can see that ArtPrompt easily sidesteps the protections of contemporary LLMs. The tool replaces the ‘safety word’ with an ASCII art representation of the word to form a new prompt. The LLM recognizes the ArtPrompt prompt output but sees no issue in responding, as the prompt doesn’t trigger any ethical or safety safeguards.

(Image credit: arXiv:2402.11753)

Another example provided in the research paper shows us how to successfully query an LLM about counterfeiting cash. Tricking a chatbot this way seems so basic, but the ArtPrompt developers assert how their tool fools today’s LLMs “effectively and efficiently.” Moreover, they claim it “outperforms all [other] attacks on average” and remains a practical, viable attack for multimodal language models for now.

[…]

Source: Researchers jailbreak AI chatbots with ASCII art — ArtPrompt bypasses safety measures to unlock malicious queries | Tom’s Hardware

HackAPrompt – a taxonomy of GPT prompt hacking techniques

[…] We present a comprehensive Taxonomical Ontology of Prompt Hacking techniques, which categorizes various methods used to manipulate Large Language Models (LLMs) through prompt hacking. This taxonomical ontology ranges from simple instructions and cognitive hacking to more complex techniques like context overflow, obfuscation, and code injection, offering a detailed insight into the diverse strategies used in prompt hacking attacks.

Taxonomical Ontology of Prompt HackingFigure 5: A Taxonomical Ontology of Prompt Hacking techniques. Blank lines are hypernyms (i.e., typos are an instance of obfuscation), while grey arrows are meronyms (i.e., Special Case attacks usually contain a Simple Instruction). Purple nodes are not attacks themselves but can be a part of attacks. Red nodes are specific examples.

Introducing the HackAPrompt Dataset

This dataset, comprising over 600,000 prompts, is split into two distinct collections: the Playground Dataset and the Submissions Dataset. The Playground Dataset provides a broad overview of the prompt hacking process through completely anonymous prompts tested on the interface, while the Submissions Dataset offers a more detailed insight with refined prompts submitted to the leaderboard, exhibiting a higher success rate of high-quality injections.

[…]

The table below contains success rates and total distribution of prompts for the two datasets.

Total Prompts Successful Prompts Success Rate
Submissions 41,596 34,641 83.2%
Playground 560,161 43,295 7.7%

Table 2: With a much higher success rate, the Submissions Dataset dataset contains a denser quantity of high quality injections. In contract, Playground Dataset is much larger and demonstrates competitor exploration of the task.

Source: HackAPrompt

Apex Legends streamers surprised to find aimbot and other hacks added to their PCs in the middle of major competition

The Apex Legends Global Series is currently in regional finals mode, but the North America finals have been delayed after two players were hacked mid-match. First, Noyan “Genburten” Ozkose of DarkZero suddenly found himself able to see other players through walls, then Phillip “ImperialHal” Dosen of TSM was given an aimbot.

Genburten’s hack happened part of the way through the day’s third match. A Twitch clip of the moment shows the words “Apex hacking global series by Destroyer2009 & R4ndom” repeating over chat as he realizes he’s been given a cheat and takes his hands off the controls. “I can see everyone!” he says, before leaving the match.

ImperialHal was hacked in the game immediately after that. “I have aimbot right now!” he shouts in a clip of the moment, before declaring “I can’t shoot.” Though he continued attempting to play out the round, the match was later abandoned.

The volunteers at the Anti-Cheat Police Department have since issued a PSA announcing, “There is currently an RCE exploit being abused in [Apex Legends]” and that it could be delivered via from the game itself, or its anti-cheat protection. “I would advise against playing any games protected by EAC or any EA titles”, they went on to say.

As for players of the tournament, they strongly recommended taking protective measures. “It is advisable that you change your Discord passwords and ensure that your emails are secure. also enable MFA for all your accounts if you have not done it yet”, they said, “perform a clean OS reinstall as soon as possible. Do not take any chances with your personal information, your PC may have been exposed to a rootkit or other malicious software that could cause further damage.”

Source: Apex Legends streamers surprised to find aimbot and other hacks added to their PCs in the middle of major competition | PC Gamer

Breach in French labor history database impacts up to 43 million people for past 20 years showing what a great idea huge centralised databases are

A French government department – responsible for registering and assisting unemployed people – is the latest victim of a mega data breach that compromised the information of up to 43 million citizens.

France Travail announced on Wednesday that it informed the country’s data protection watchdog (CNIL) of an incident that exposed a swathe of personal information about individuals dating back 20 years.

The department’s statement reveals that names, dates of birth, social security numbers, France Travail identifiers, email addresses, postal addresses, and phone numbers were exposed.

[…]

It’s not clear whether the database’s entire contents were stolen by attackers, but the announcement suggests that at least some of the data was extracted.

“The database allegedly extracted illicitly contains the personal identification data of people currently registered, people previously registered over the last 20 years as well as people not registered on the list of job seekers but having a candidate space on francetravail.fr,” the statement reads, which was translated electronically from French.

“It is therefore potentially the personal data of 43 million people which have been exfiltrated.”

The Cybercrime Brigade of the Paris Judicial Police Department is heading up the investigation into the breach, which it says was carried out between February 6 and March 5.

[…]

“It’s not clear how the attack happened apart from reports that the attackers posed as members of Cap Emploi. This could indicate some kind of social engineering over a more technical attack, or likely the two together.”

Cap Emploi, is a similar department that looks after disabled people looking for work.

France Travail will soon undertake the mammoth task of directly informing those affected by email or by other means, and has apologized for the incident.

[…]

This data breach is a real stinker for France Travail, which seems to be unable to catch a break. In August last year, it was caught up in an incident at a service provider that also compromised the data of an estimasted 10 million French citizens.

Wider reporting at the time pinned the blamed for the attacks on Cl0p’s supply chain assault of MOVEit MFT.

It’s been a tough month for France in terms of cybersecurity and data protection too. Just a month ago, the contry was contending with what was called the largest-ever data breach.

Data breaches at Viamedis and Almerys, two third-party payment providers for healthcare and insurance companies, led to more than 33 million people’s data being compromised.

Yann Padova, a data protection lawyer and former secretary general at the CNIL, told Franceinfo at the time that he believed the incident to be the largest of its kind in France.

[…]

Source: Record mega breach in France impacts up to 43 million people • The Register

Vehicle Cloning — Another Reason Not To Use Automated License Plate Readers

Over the last decade, increasing numbers of automated license plate readers (ALPR) have been installed on roads, bringing with them a variety of privacy problems, as Techdirt has reported. It’s easy to see why ALPR is popular with the authorities: license plate readers seem a simple way to monitor driving behavior and to catch people breaking traffic laws, by speeding, for example.

Since the whole process can be automated, from reading the license plates to sending out fines, it looks like an efficient, low-cost alternative to placing large numbers of police officers around the road network. There’s just one problem: the whole system is based on the assumption that the license plate on the car is genuine, and can be used to identify the person responsible for the vehicle. As an article on “car cloning” in the Guardian reports, drivers in the UK are discovering that this assumption no longer holds.

The problem is that people are making copies of other drivers’ license plates, and using them on similar-looking vehicles — generally the same model and same color — to break the law with impunity. When the ALPR cameras catch the cloners speeding, or failing to pay fees for entering special zones like London’s Ultra Low Emission Zone (ULEZ), the fines are sent to the actual owner of the license plate, not the perpetrator. The result is misery for those unlucky enough to have their license plates cloned, since it is hard to convince the authorities that automated license plate readers have made a mistake when there is apparent photographic evidence they haven’t. The experience of one driver interviewed by the Guardian is typical:

The most recent incident happened in July 2021, when he received two penalty charge notices from different London councils — one for driving in a bus lane and the other for an illegal left turn. Both notices included photos purporting to show his five-door Audi A3 car.

Despite him providing extensive evidence that at the time of one of the offences his vehicle was in a car park, and demonstrating that the one in the photo appeared to be a three-door Audi A1, the council concerned rejected his appeal.

Only when he sent in photos of his vehicle type and the one in the CCTV image where he had “circled all the differences” was the matter dropped.

Even when no fines are involved, vehicle cloning can cause financial problems for innocent drivers, as another case mentioned by the Guardian shows:

Late last year, the Guardian was contacted by another driver who had fallen victim to car cloning. The 88-year-old’s insurance doubled at renewal to £1,259 [about $1600] and she was told this was because her Ford Fiesta had been involved in an accident on the M25 [London’s main ring road] .

Despite her pointing out that she had not driven on the M25 for more than a decade, and that she had been either at church or at home at the time of the accident — and the fact that she had reported that her car had been cloned to Hertfordshire police — her insurer, Zurich, refused to take the claim off her file. Only after the Guardian intervened did the firm restore her no-claims bonus and reduce her premium accordingly.

The more automated license plate readers are installed in order to stop people breaking traffic laws, the greater the incentive for criminals and the unscrupulous to use cloned plates to break those laws without any consequences. What may once have seemed the system’s great strength — the fact that it provides photographic evidence of law breaking — turns out to be a huge weakness that can be turned against it.

Source: Vehicle Cloning — Another Reason Not To Use Automated License Plate Readers | Techdirt

Want to Steal a Tesla? set up a guest wifi with a fake site, steal the password and make your own key

Security researchers report they uncovered a design flaw that let them hijack a Tesla using a Flipper Zero, a controversial $169 hacking tool. Partners Tommy Mysk and Talal Haj Bakry of Mysk Inc. said the attack is as simple as swiping a Tesla owner’s login information, opening the Tesla app, and driving away. The victim would have no idea they lost their $40,000 vehicle. Mysk said the exploit takes minutes, and to prove it all works, he stole his own car.

The issue isn’t “hacking” in the sense of breaking into software, it’s a social engineering attack that fools a user into handing over their information. Using a Flipper, the researchers set up a WiFi network called “Tesla Guest,” the name Tesla uses for its guest networks at service centers. Mysk then created a website that looks like Tesla’s login page.

The process is simple. In this scenario, hackers could broadcast the network near a charging station, where a bored driver might be looking for entertainment. The victim connects to the WiFi network and enters their username and password on the fake Tesla website. The hacker then uses the credentials to log in to the real Tesla app, which triggers a two-factor authentication code. The victim enters that code into the fake website, and the thief gains access to their account. Once you’re logged into the Tesla app, you can set up a “phone key” which lets you unlock and control the car over Bluetooth with a smartphone. From there, the car is yours.

You can see Mysk’s demonstration of the attack in the video below.

Cybersecurity: Can a Tesla stop phishing and social engineering attacks?

According to Mysk, Tesla doesn’t notify users when new keys are created, so the victim wouldn’t know they’ve been compromised. Mysk said the bad guys wouldn’t need to steal the car right away, either, because the app shows you the physical location of the vehicle. The Tesla owner could finish charging the car and drive off to go shopping or park outside their house. The thief would just watch the car’s location using the app, and then waltz up at an opportune moment and drive away.

“This means with a leaked email and password, an owner could lose their Tesla vehicle.

[…]

Source: Want to Steal a Tesla? Try Using a Flipper Zero

Chinese and US researchers show new side channel can reproduce fingerprints by listening to swiping sounds on screen

An interesting new attack on biometric security has been outlined by a group of researchers from China and the US. PrintListener: Uncovering the Vulnerability of Fingerprint Authentication via the Finger Friction Sound [PDF] proposes a side-channel attack on the sophisticated Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). The attack leverages the sound characteristics of a user’s finger swiping on a touchscreen to extract fingerprint pattern features. Following tests, the researchers assert that they can successfully attack “up to 27.9% of partial fingerprints and 9.3% of complete fingerprints within five attempts at the highest security FAR [False Acceptance Rate] setting of 0.01%.” This is claimed to be the first work that leverages swiping sounds to infer fingerprint information.

[…]

the PrintListener paper says that “finger-swiping friction sounds can be captured by attackers online with a high possibility.” The source of the finger-swiping sounds can be popular apps like Discord, Skype, WeChat, FaceTime, etc. Any chatty app where users carelessly perform swiping actions on the screen while the device mic is live. Hence the side-channel attack name – PrintListener.

[…]

Source: Your fingerprints can be recreated from the sounds made when you swipe on a touchscreen — Chinese and US researchers show new side channel can reproduce fingerprints to enable attacks | Tom’s Hardware

iOS and Android users face scans used to break into bank accounts

[…]

GoldPickaxe and GoldPickaxe.iOS target Android and iOS respectively, tricking users into performing biometric verification checks that are ultimately used to bypass the same checks employed by legitimate banking apps in Vietnam and Thailand – the geographic focus of these ongoing attacks.

The iOS version is believed only to be targeting users in Thailand, masquerading as the Thai government’s official digital pensions app. That said, some think it has also made its way to Vietnam. This is because very similar attacks, which led to the theft of tens of thousands of dollars, were reported in the region earlier this month.

“It is of note that GoldPickaxe.iOS is the first iOS Trojan observed by Group-IB that combines the following functionalities: collecting victims’ biometric data, ID documents, intercepting SMS, and proxying traffic through the victims’ devices,” the researchers said.

“Its Android sibling has even more functionalities than its iOS counterpart, due to more restrictions and the closed nature of iOS.”

[…]

Researchers also found the Android version bore many more disguises than the iOS version – taking the form of more than 20 different government, finance, and utility organizations in Thailand, and allowing attackers to steal credentials for all of these services.

How’d they get on Apple phones?

In the case of iOS, the attackers had to be cunning. Their first method involved the abuse of Apple’s TestFlight platform, which allows apps to be distributed as betas before full release to the App Store.

After this method was stymied, attackers switched to more sophisticated social engineering. This involved influencing users to enroll their devices in an MDM program, allowing the attackers to push bad apps to devices that way.

In all cases, the initial contact with victims was made by the attackers impersonating government authorities on the LINE messaging app, one of the region’s most popular.

[…]

Once the biometrics scans were captured, attackers then used these scans, along with deepfake software, to generate models of the victim’s face.

Attackers would download the target banking app onto their own devices and use the deepfake models, along with the stolen identity documents and intercepted SMS messages, to remotely break into victims’ banks.

[…]

Facial biometrics were only mandated in Thailand last year, with plans first announced in March with an enforcement date set for July. Vietnam is poised to mandate similar controls by April this year.

From July 2023, all Thai banking apps had to comply with the new initiative and replace one-time passcodes with facial biometrics to decrease the threat of financial fraud in the region. This applied specifically to transactions exceeding 50,000 BAT (roughly $1,400).

[…]

Source: Stolen iOS users face scans used to break into bank accounts

Which goes to show – biometrics are unchangeable and so make for a really bad (and potentially dangerous, if people are inclinded to amputate parts of your anatomy) security pass.

1/2 of all French citizens data stolen in healthcare billing breach

Nearly half the citizens of France have had their data exposed in a massive security breach at two third-party healthcare payment servicers, the French data privacy watchdog disclosed last week.

Payments outfits Viamedis and Almerys both experienced breaches of their systems in late January, the National Commission on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL) revealed, leading to the theft of data belonging to more than 33 million customers. Affected data on customers and their families includes dates of birth, marital status, social security numbers and insurance information. No banking info, medical data or contact information was compromised, the CNIL added.

[…]

Viamedis was reportedly compromised through a phishing attack that targeted healthcare professionals, and used credentials stolen from such professionals to gain access to its systems. Almerys didn’t disclose how its compromise occurred, but it’s possible the ingress was similar in nature – it admitted the attacker gained access through a portal used by healthcare providers.

[…]

Source: 33m French citizens data stolen in healthcare billing breach

Decrypting / Mounting Bitlocker protected drives

Attacks come in two main forms: one is scanning the drive for memory dumps and the other is by sniffing the bitlocker key through RAM dumping on cold boots.

Cold Boot Attacks

We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems — BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt — using no special devices or materials.
Introductory blog post
Frequently asked questions
Experiment guide
Source code

Source: Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

Over time there have been many different physical attacks against full disk encryption, such as Cold Boot attacks [0][1] that we have previously researched. In addition, various attacks based on TPM interface sniffing [2] or DMA [3] have been used to gain access to an ­­­­encryption key.

[…]

I captured the SPI signals with the Saleae Logic Pro 8 logic analyzer, which is capable of recording four signals up to 100 MHz. The wide terminal pitch of SOIC-8 package allows an effortless way to hook the probes, and the whole capture process can be performed under one minute.

The Logic 2 application supports SPI decoding out-of-the-box. The only caveat is to remember that the SS-line is inverted. Fortunately, the decoding options of Saleae allow us to choose whether the chip is selected when the SS-line is high or low. The screenshot below shows decoded MOSI and MISO byte streams from the capture.

[…]

Even though Proof of Concepts are awesome, proper weaponizing usually takes the attack to a whole new level, and as we stated at the beginning of this post, the real advantage comes if this can be performed with minimal effort. Therefore, I decided to automate the attack process as far as possible. The toolchain consists of the following parts:

  • Custom High-Level Analyzer for searching VMK entries from TPM transactions.
  • Docker container, which includes all the necessary tools to mount the drive just by giving VMK.

The workflow with the tooling is as follows:

  1. Sniff the SPI bus and extract VMK.
  2. Remove the drive and attach it to the attacker’s machine or boot the target directly from a USB-stick if allowed.
  3. Decrypt and mount the drive.

The video below show how the analyzer is able to extract the VMK from the sniffed data. The key can be then passed to the mount tool which decrypts the content and drops you to a shell where you are able to modify the volume content.

video

You can find the above tooling on GitHub.

Source: Sniff, there leaks my BitLocker key

TLDR: You can sniff BitLocker keys in the default config, from either a TPM1.2 or TPM2.0 device, using a dirt cheap FPGA (~$40NZD) and now publicly available code, or with a sufficiently fancy logic analyzer. After sniffing, you can decrypt the drive. Don’t want to be vulnerable to this? Enable additional pre-boot authentication.

Source: Extracting BitLocker keys from a TPM

Scanning RAM dumps / hiberyfile.sys

Volatility is a framework for memory analysis and forensics. The Volatility plugin: BitLocker allows you to retrieves the Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK) in memory. The FVEK can then be used with Dislocker to decrypt the volume. This plugin has been tested on every 64-bit Windows version from Windows 7 to Windows 10 and is fully compatible with Dislocker.

Elcomsoft Forensic Disk Decryptor is a commercial (and expensive!) way to automate the use of this tooling. Instantly access data stored in encrypted BitLocker, FileVault 2, PGP Disk, TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt disks and containers. The tool extracts cryptographic keys from RAM captures, hibernation and page files or uses plain-text password or escrow keys to decrypt files and folders stored in crypto containers or mount encrypted volumes as new drive letters for instant, real-time access.

Supports: BitLocker (including TPM configurations), FileVault 2 (including APFS volumes), LUKS, PGP Disk, TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt encrypted containers and full disk encryption, BitLocker To Go, XTS-AES BitLocker encryption, Jetico BestCrypt, RAM dumps, hibernation files, page files

They do offer a trial version and the current version seems to be 2.20.1011

Hackers find out worth of Iranian drones sold to Russia

Shahed-136 drones in launcher

Hackers from the Prana Network group have compromised the mail servers of the Iranian company IRGC Sahara Thunder, which contained an array of data on the production of Shahed-136 attack drones for Russia.

Source: a statement by Prana Network, reported by Militarnyi

Details: As noted, the IRGC Sahara Thunder company is a fictitious company run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that facilitates the sale of weapons to Russia.

In particular, the hackers published information about negotiations between the Iranian and Russian sides on the location of production in the Russian free economic zone Alabuga.

It is noted that the Iranian side announced the starting price of the Shahed attack drone at 23 million roubles per unit (about US$375,000). However, during the negotiations, an agreement was reached at the level of 12 million roubles per unit, when ordering 6,000 units (about US$193,000) or 18 million roubles (about US$290,000) when ordering 2,000 units.

According to other published documents, at least part of the Russian Federation’s financial transactions and payments with Iran are made in gold.

For example, in February 2023, Alabuga Machinery transferred 2 million grams of gold to the Iranian shell company Sahara Thunder, presumably as payment for services and goods.

Background: In August 2023, The Washington Post obtained internal documents on the operation of the Iranian drone manufacturing plant in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, Russia, which is scheduled to produce 6,000 Shahed kamikaze drones by 2025.

Source: Hackers find out worth of Iranian drones sold to Russia

Inside the Underground Site Where ‘Neural Networks’ Churn Out Fake IDs

An underground website called OnlyFake is claiming to use “neural networks” to generate realistic looking photos of fake IDs for just $15, radically disrupting the marketplace for fake identities and cybersecurity more generally. This technology, which 404 Media has verified produces fake IDs nearly instantly, could streamline everything from bank fraud to laundering stolen funds.

In our own tests, OnlyFake created a highly convincing California driver’s license, complete with whatever arbitrary name, biographical information, address, expiration date, and signature we wanted. The photo even gives the appearance that the ID card is laying on a fluffy carpet, as if someone has placed it on the floor and snapped a picture, which many sites require for verification purposes.

[…]

 

Source: Inside the Underground Site Where ‘Neural Networks’ Churn Out Fake IDs

Netherlands reveals Chinese attack on defence servers using CoatHanger malware on Fortinet Devices – a real pain to remove

Dutch authorities are lifting the curtain on an attempted cyberattack last year at its Ministry of Defense (MoD), blaming Chinese state-sponsored attackers for the espionage-focused intrusion.

Specialists from the Netherlands’ Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) were called in to investigate an intrusion at an MOD network last year, uncovering a previously unseen malware they’re calling Coathanger.

The name, authorities said, was conjured up based on the “peculiar phrase” displayed by the malware when encrypting the configuration on disk: “She took his coat and hung it up.”

A deep dive into Coathanger’s code revealed the remote access trojan (RAT) was purpose-built for Fortinet’s FortiGate next-generation firewalls (NGFWs) and the initial access to the MoD’s network was gained through exploiting CVE-2022-42475.

According to the MIVD and AIVD, the RAT operates outside of traditional detection measures and acts as a second-stage malware, mainly to establish persistent access for attackers, surviving reboots and firmware upgrades.

Even fully patched FortiGate devices could still have Coathanger installed if they were compromised before upgrading.

In the cybersecurity advisory published today, authorities said the malware was highly stealthy and difficult to detect using default FortiGate CLI commands, since Coathanger hooks most system calls that could identify it as malicious.

They also made clear that Coathanger is definitely different from BOLDMOVE, another RAT targeting FortiGate appliances.

“For the first time, the MIVD has chosen to make public a technical report on the working methods of Chinese hackers. It is important to attribute such espionage activities by China,” said defense minister Kajsa Ollongren in an automatically translated statement. “In this way, we increase international resilience against this type of cyber espionage.”

The advisory also noted that Dutch authorities had previously spotted Coathanger present on other victims’ networks too, prior to the incident at the MOD.

As for attribution, MIVD and AIVD said they can pin Coathanger to Chinese state-sponsored attackers with “high confidence.”

“MIVD and AIVD emphasize that this incident does not stand on its own, but is part of a wider trend of Chinese political espionage against the Netherlands and its allies,” the advisory reads.

The attackers responsible for the attack were known for conducting “wide and opportunistic” scans for exposed FortiGate appliances vulnerable to CVE-2022-42475 and then exploiting it using an obfuscated connection.

After gaining an initial foothold inside the network, which was used by the MOD’s research and development division, the attackers performed reconnaissance and stole a list of user accounts from the Active Directory server.

Not much else was said about the attacker’s activity, other than the fact that the overall impact of the intrusion was limited thanks to the MOD’s network segmentation.

For those worried about whether Chinese cyberspies are lurking in their firewall, the Joint Signal Cyber Unit of the Netherlands (JCSU-NL) published a full list of indicators of compromise (IOCs) and various detection methods on its GitHub page.

The collection of materials includes YARA rules, a JA3 hash, CLI commands, file checksums, and more. The authorities said each detection method should be seen as independent and used together since some focus on general IOCs and others were developed to spot Coathanger activity specifically.

If there is evidence of compromise, it’s possible other hosts that are reachable by the FortiGate device are also compromised. There is also an increased likelihood that attackers may perform hands-on-keyboard attacks.

Affected users should isolate their device immediately, collect and review logs, and consider calling in third-party digital forensics specialists, the advisory reads. Victims should also inform their country’s cybersecurity authority: NCSC, CISA, etc.

The only way to remove Coathanger from an infected device is to completely reformat the device, before reinstalling and reconfiguring it.

Whiffs of China’s involvement in CVE-2022-42475 exploits have long been suspected, but for the first time they’re confirmed today.

First disclosed in December 2022, a month later Fortinet said it was aware that the vulnerability was tied to the breach of a government or government-related organization that had been infected with custom-made malware.

At the time, no fingers were officially pointed other than the fact that this custom malware was compiled on a machine in the UTC+8 timezone, so realistically it was most likely going to be either China or Russia.

China was also accused of being behind exploits of separate Fortinet bug in March, again using bespoke malware for the purposes of cyber espionage. ®

Source: Netherlands reveals Chinese spies attacked its defense dept • The Register

Cloudflare Hacked

cloudflare bad gateway error page

Web security company Cloudflare on Thursday revealed that a threat actor used stolen credentials to gain access to some of its internal systems.

The incident was discovered on November 23, nine days after the threat actor, believed to be state-sponsored, used credentials compromised in the October 2023 Okta hack to access Cloudflare’s internal wiki and bug database.

The stolen login information, an access token and three service account credentials, were not rotated following the Okta incident, allowing the attackers to probe and perform reconnaissance of Cloudflare systems starting November 14, the security firm explains.

According to Cloudflare, the attackers managed to access an AWS environment, as well as Atlassian Jira and Confluence, but network segmentation prevented them from accessing its Okta instance and the Cloudflare dashboard.

With access to the Atlassian suite, the threat actor started looking for information on the Cloudflare network, searching the wiki for “things like remote access, secret, client-secret, openconnect, cloudflared, and token”. In total, 36 Jira tickets and 202 wiki pages were accessed.

On November 16, the attackers created an Atlassian account to gain persistent access to the environment, and on November 20 returned to verify that they still had access.

On November 22, the threat actor installed the Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework, gaining persistent access to the Atlassian server, which was then used to move laterally. They attempted to access a non-production console server at a São Paulo, Brazil, data center that is not yet operational.

The attackers viewed 120 code repositories and downloaded 76 of them to the Atlassian server, but did not exfiltrate them.

“The 76 source code repositories were almost all related to how backups work, how the global network is configured and managed, how identity works at Cloudflare, remote access, and our use of Terraform and Kubernetes. A small number of the repositories contained encrypted secrets which were rotated immediately even though they were strongly encrypted themselves,” Cloudflare notes.

The attackers used a Smartsheet service account to access Cloudflare’s Atlassian suite, and the account was terminated on November 23, within 35 minutes after the unauthorized access was identified. The user account created by the attacker was found and deactivated 48 minutes later.

Cloudflare says it also put in place firewall rules to block the attackers’ known IP addresses and that the Sliver Adversary Emulation Framework was removed on November 24.

[…]

The goal of the attack, Cloudflare says, was to obtain information on the company’s infrastructure, likely to gain a deeper foothold. CrowdStrike performed a separate investigation into the incident, but discovered no evidence of additional compromise.

“We are confident that between our investigation and CrowdStrike’s, we fully understand the threat actor’s actions and that they were limited to the systems on which we saw their activity,” Cloudflare notes.

Source: Cloudflare Hacked by Suspected State-Sponsored Threat Actor  – SecurityWeek

Akira ransomware gang says it stole personnel passport scans and other PII from Lush

The Akira ransomware gang is claiming responsiblity for the “cybersecurity incident” at British bath bomb merchant.

Akira says it has stolen 110 GB of data from the UK-headquartered global cosmetics giant, which has more than 900 stores worldwide, allegedly including “a lot of personal documents” such as passport scans.

Passport scans are routinely collected to verify identities during the course of the hiring process, which suggests Akira’s affiliate likely had access to a system containing staff-related data.

Company documents relating to accounting, finances, tax, projects, and clients are also said to be included in the archives grabbed by the cybercriminals, who are threatening to make the data public soon. There is still no evidence to suggest customer data was exposed.

Akira’s retro-vibe website separates victims into different sections: One for companies who didn’t pay the ransom and thus had their data published, and another for those whose data is to be published on an undisclosed date.

A likely conclusion to draw, if the incident does indeed involve ransomware as the criminals claim, is that there may have been negotiations which have stalled, with Akira using the threat of data publication as a means to hurry along the talks.

The Register approached Lush for comment. Its representatives acknowledged the request but did not provide a statement in time for publication.

Lush last communicated about the situation on January 11, saying it was responding to an “incident” and working with outside forensic experts to investigate the issue – often phrasing used in a ransomware attack.

“The investigation is at an early stage but we have taken immediate steps to secure and screen all systems in order to contain the incident and limit the impact on our operations,” it said. “We take cybersecurity exceptionally seriously and have informed relevant authorities.”

The statement came a day after a post was made to the unofficial Lush Reddit community. Written by a user who seemingly had inside knowledge of the incident, the post claimed members of staff were instructed to send their laptops to head office for “cleaning” – an assertion that El Reg understands to be true.

[…]

Source: Akira ransomware gang says it stole passport scans from Lush • The Register

Have I Been Pwned adds 71 million emails from Naz.API stolen account list

Have I Been Pwned has added almost 71 million email addresses associated with stolen accounts in the Naz.API dataset to its data breach notification service.

The Naz.API dataset is a massive collection of 1 billion credentials compiled using credential stuffing lists and data stolen by information-stealing malware.

Credential stuffing lists are collections of login name and password pairs stolen from previous data breaches that are used to breach accounts on other sites.

[…]

This dataset has been floating around the data breach community for quite a while but rose to notoriety after it was used to fuel an open-source intelligence (OSINT) platform called illicit.services.

This service allows visitors to search a database of stolen information, including names, phone numbers, email addresses, and other personal data.

The service shut down in July 2023 out of concerns it was being used for Doxxing and SIM-swapping attacks. However, the operator enabled the service again in September.

Illicit.services use data from various sources, but one of its largest sources of data came from the Naz.API dataset, which was shared privately among a small number of people.

Each line in the Naz.API data consists of a login URL, its login name, and an associated password stolen from a person’s device

[…]

“Here’s the back story: this week I was contacted by a well-known tech company that had received a bug bounty submission based on a credential stuffing list posted to a popular hacking forum,” explained a blog post by Hunt.

“Whilst this post dates back almost 4 months, it hadn’t come across my radar until now and inevitably, also hadn’t been sent to the aforementioned tech company.”

“They took it seriously enough to take appropriate action against their (very sizeable) user base which gave me enough cause to investigate it further than your average cred stuffing list.”

Threat actors sharing the Naz.API dataset on hacking forums
Threat actors sharing the Naz.API dataset on hacking forums
Source: BleepingComputer

According to Hunt, the Naz.API dataset consists of 319 files totaling 104GB and containing 70,840,771 unique email addresses.

However, while there are close to 71 million unique emails, for each email address, there are likely many other records for the different sites’ credentials were stolen from.

Hunt says the Naz.API data is likely old, as it contained one of his and other HIBP subscribers’ passwords that were used in the past. Hunt says his password was used in 2011, meaning that some of the data is over 13 years old.

To check if your credentials are in the Naz.API dataset, you can perform a search at Have I Been Pwned. If your email is found to be associated with Naz.API, the site will warn you, indicating that your computer was infected with information-stealing malware at one point.

[…]

Source: Have I Been Pwned adds 71 million emails from Naz.API stolen account list

Thieves steal 35.5M customers’ data from Vans, Dickies, Timberlands parent comp’s sales systems

a vans sneaker and timberland boot with an axe through them

VF Corporation, parent company of clothes and footwear brands including Vans and North Face, says 35.5 million customers were impacted in some way when criminals broke into their systems in December.

The announcement was made in a Thursday 8-K/A filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and we’re only left to speculate about what kind of information the attackers may have scrambled away with.

The parent company of fashion labels, which also include Supreme, Timberland, and Dickies did, however, confirm the type of data that couldn’t have been accessed.

VF Corp said that customers’ social security numbers (SSNs), bank account information, and payment card information remain uncompromised as these are not stored in its IT systems.

There’s also no evidence to suggest that consumer passwords were accessed, it confirmed, although it did caveat this with “the investigation remains ongoing”.

If you want to really look between the lines of the document’s wording, you’ll see that VF Corp explicitly said SSNs, financial information, and passwords – all excluded from potential compromise – were all explicitly defined as being consumer-related specifically.

The same goes for the number of individuals affected – 35.5 million “individual consumers” had their personal information stolen.

[…]

When the attack was first disclosed, the clothes seller said its ability to fulfill orders was affected, but online and retail stores were still up and running as normal.

This week’s filing said the company’s ability to replenish retail stores’ inventory was affected and combined with the fulfillment issues. This led to customer order cancellations and reduced demand across some of its brands’ e-commerce sites.

“Since the filing of the original report, while VF is still experiencing minor residual impacts from the cyber incident, VF has resumed retail store inventory replenishment and product order fulfillment, and is caught up on fulfilling orders that were delayed as a result of the cyber incident,” the filing reads.

“Since the filing of the original report, VF has substantially restored the IT systems and data that were impacted by the cyber incident, but continues to work through minor operational impacts.”

The attack on VF Corp is suspected to have involved ransomware. The filings mention parts of its IT systems being encrypted, and the AlphV/BlackCat gang claimed the attack days after its disclosure, but the company has not confirmed this to be the case.

[…]

Source: Thieves steal 35.5M customers’ data from Vans sneakers maker • The Register

The real question here is why on earth these guys were holding so many customers information? And in a centralised system?

Apple knew AirDrop users could be identified and tracked as early as 2019. Still not fixed.

a shadowy spy looking at people using airdrop on a subway stationSecurity researchers warned Apple as early as 2019 about vulnerabilities in its AirDrop wireless sharing function that Chinese authorities claim they recently used to track down users of the feature, the researchers told CNN, in a case that experts say has sweeping implications for global privacy.

The Chinese government’s actions targeting a tool that Apple customers around the world use to share photos and documents — and Apple’s apparent inaction to address the flaws — revive longstanding concerns by US lawmakers and privacy advocates about Apple’s relationship with China and about authoritarian regimes’ ability to twist US tech products to their own ends.

[…]

A Chinese tech firm, Beijing-based Wangshendongjian Technology, was able to compromise AirDrop to identify users on the Beijing subway accused of sharing “inappropriate information,” judicial authorities in Beijing said this week.

[..]

A group of Germany-based researchers at the Technical University of Darmstadt, who first discovered the flaws in 2019, told CNN Thursday they had confirmation Apple received their original report at the time but that the company appears not to have acted on the findings. The same group published a proposed fix for the issue in 2021, but Apple appears not to have implemented it, the researchers said.

[…]

Chinese authorities claim they exploited the vulnerabilities by collecting some of the basic identifying information that must be transferred between two Apple devices when they use AirDrop — data including device names, email addresses and phone numbers.

Ordinarily, this information is scrambled for privacy reasons. But, according to a separate 2021 analysis of the Darmstadt research by the UK-based cybersecurity firm Sophos, Apple appeared not to have taken the extra precaution of adding bogus data to the mix to further randomize the results — a process known as “salting.”

[…]

One reason Chinese officials may have wanted their exploit known, said Ismail, is that it could scare dissidents away from using AirDrop.

And now that the Beijing authorities have announced it exploited the vulnerability, Apple may face retaliation from Chinese authorities if the tech firm tries to fix the issue, multiple experts said.

China is the largest foreign market for Apple’s products, with sales there representing about a fifth of the company’s total revenue in 2022

[…]

Source: Apple knew AirDrop users could be identified and tracked as early as 2019, researchers say | CNN Business

Swatting a cancer hospital’s patients after hack is now a thing

After intruders broke into Seattle’s Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center’s IT network in November and stole medical records – everything from Social Security numbers to diagnoses and lab results – miscreants threatened to turn on the patients themselves directly.

The idea being, it seems, that those patients and the media coverage from any swatting will put pressure on the US hospital to pay up and end the extortion. Other crews do similar when attacking IT service provider: they don’t just extort the suppliers, they also threaten or further extort customers of those providers.

[…]

The cancer center, which operates more than 10 clinics in Washington’s Puget Sound region, declined to answer additional comments about the threats.

Another health network in Oklahoma — Integris Health, which operates a network of 15 hospitals and 43 clinics — last month notified patients about a similar “cyber event” in which criminals may have accessed personal data. Shortly after, some of these patients reported receiving emails from miscreants threatening to sell their information on the dark web.

[…]

Sam Rubin, VP of Unit 42 Consulting at Palo Alto Networks, told The Register his team hadn’t seen any swatting attempts by extortion crews in 2023, though the shift in tactics seems likely.

“But I’m not surprised at all,” he added, about the reports of Seattle cancer patients potentially receiving these types of threats.

“If you look over the past couple of years, we’ve seen this continuing evolution of escalating extortion tactics,” Rubin said. “If you go back in time, it was just encryption.”

Over the past year, Unit 42 has seen cybercriminals send threatening texts to the spouse of a CEO whose organization was being extorted, Rubin added, again piling on the pressure for payment. The consulting and incident response unit has also witnessed miscreants sending flowers to a victim company’s executive team, and issuing ransom demands via printers connected to the affected firm’s network.

“We had another one where the victim organization decided not to pay, but then the ransomware actors went on to harass customers of that organization,”

[…]

Meanwhile, ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure including hospitals become more frequent. Emsisoft reported 46 infections against US hospitals networks last year alone, up from 25 in 2022. In total, at least 141 hospitals were infected, and at least 32 of the 46 networks had data — including protected health information — stolen.

It’s bad enough that these attacks have diverted ambulances and postponed critical care for patients, and now the criminals are inflicting even more pain on people. Last year this included leaking breast cancer patients’ nudes. Swatting seems to be the next, albeit abhorrent, step.

Source: Swatting: The new normal in ransomware extortion tactics • The Register